This article argues that warfare has been marginalised in theories of nationalism, but that in conjunction with nationalism is vital for understanding the rise of nation-states, the formation of nations and the nature of the international system. It offers a critique of statist approaches, suggests mechanisms through which warfare may sacralise nations, and explores different patterns of nation-state formation as they affect the interstate system. In particular, it emphasises tensions between state-and nationformation as activated by the fortunes of war and the destabilising effects of waves of imperial dissolution, which are accompanied by patterns of re-imperialization. It suggests that it is simplistic both to claim that war has led to a transition from empires to nation-states and that contemporary practices of war-making have led to a postnational era.
The study of warfare remains a lacuna in theories of nationalism, including the work of Ernest Gellner who is deservedly regarded as a foundational scholar in the field.
Until his late writings Gellner's view of nationalism was benign, understanding it as a necessary concomitant of the transition from agro-literate to modern industrial societies. So too was his conception of the resulting international order: the nationstate system operated to decentre power, functioning as a series of (canal) locks.
Potential conflict between ethnically diverse populations of unequal power was thereby defused so that each group could find its distinctive level in a competitive world. (Gellner 1964: 175-8) . In stressing the emancipatory aspects of nationalism and its compatibility with a liberal modernity, Gellner rightly redressed Elie Kedourie's emphatically negative portrayal of nationalism as an irrationalist ideology that generated war and revolutionary upheavals (Kedourie 1966) . Nonetheless, he, like most theorists of nationalism, neglected the role of warfare in conjunction with nationalism as a causal force in the formation of nations, nation-states, and the international system. I wish to address this failure and examine the very different view of our world that results, one that qualifies the connection between nationalism and modernisation.
There are at least four reasons for bringing warfare (in its changing forms) into our theoretical understanding of nationalism (see further, Hutchinson 2017) . First, warfare has been central for much nation-state formation. Michael Howard reminds us that most nation-states that came into existence before the mid-20 th century were created by war or had their boundaries defined by wars or internal violence (Howard 1991: 39-41) . It is also hardly an exaggeration to say that modern nationalism, in both its civic and ethnic varieties, crystallised in war. The former was expressed during the victories as well as calamitous defeats, and the memories of these contrasting fortunes are invoked to draw moral lessons. In the words of Ernest Renan (1882: 26-9 ) 'a heritage of glory and a reluctance to break apart, to realize the same programme in the future; to have suffered , worked, hoped together; that is worth more than common taxes and frontiers… In fact, national sorrows are more significant than triumphs because they impose obligations and demand a common effort.' An awareness of the vicissitudes of war and the vulnerabilities of even the greatest states has often given heart to nationalists fretting against the subordination of their peoples in imperial states (Talmon 1960: 270-1) Third, the world order of nation-states is a recent product of the total wars that resulted in the collapse of European empires in a series of convulsive moments in the 20 th century. These had the effects of propelling a mass of ill-defined and fragile post-colonial territorial units onto the world stage. Although institutions of transnational governance, such as the League of Nations and the UN) were created in the aftermath of these wars, they have failed to resolve the security problems created by these transitions. 
War and the Nation-State
These criticisms do not at first sight apply to the work of Charles Tilly (1992) and Michael Mann (1986; 1993; who argue first that the modern nation-state is a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war and second that war is an organizational phenomenon from which the state derived its administrative machinery (Centeno 2002: 101 Roberts (1956 ), Geoffrey Parker (1976 , Jeremy Black (1994), and W. H. McNeill (1984) . This revolution resulted in new technologies, tactics and strategies, and a rapid increase in the size of armies relative to the population. Early medieval nations, taking on 'sacred' qualities via associations with the Crusades, played a crucial role in territorial state-formation and war-making.
Crusading wars against both Islamic territories and internal heretics (e.g. Cathars)
were important sources of state-building, used by rulers to centralize power, impose taxation legitimized by Papal Bulls over clergy and laity, and pursue territorial expansion. Ernst Kantorowicz (1951; 1957: 236-42) argues that consequently the concept of martial martyrdom became this-worldly to encompass a heroic death for a terrestrial fatherland. By the end of 13 th century the idea of the loyal soldier dying for the patria was being charged with religious expression in state propaganda. Norman
Housley locates the growth of a sanctified patriotism that, to varying degrees, shaped both state-building and popular mobilization from the 14 th century in England and
France (during the Hundred Years' War), Bohemia (the Hussite rebellions) and the Spanish Habsburg territories. Such conflicts were suffused with Crusading imagery and claims that kingdoms or peoples were new Israels (Housley 2000: 223-4) .
A related problem is the failure (especially on Tilly's part) to explore the sources of the legitimacy of medieval and early modern states. An overstress on coercive power insufficiently recognises that warfare could destroy states, as well as provoke rebellions in the name of the community of the realm (in Reynolds' terms, the nation).
2 Although medieval monarchs (in England, France and Spain) had the rights to demand military service and taxation from their subjects, these could not be imposed without the consent of free men (Reynolds 1997: 305) . Much of the authority of rulers depended on their exercise of judicial, administrative, and lawmaking duties which consumed in peace the majority of state expenditures. While war could extend the administrative and territorial reach of the state, it could also result in breakdowns of such key functions, as well as economic distress. (Gunn et al. 2008: 386-8) .
When this occurred a national sentiment crystallised intermittently against rulers to assert the rights of the 'community of the realm', represented by nobility, clergy and urban middling orders. Hoping to gain support from their subjects, monarchs appealed to xenophobic national sentiment by the 13 th century: King Edward 1 sought to deflect internal dissensions by claiming that the King of France planned to wipe out the English language (Reynolds 1997: 272) , but monarchical failure -of Henry III in his wars against the French and the Welsh -provoked opposition on the part of the nobility and middling orders combined with demands that he rely on his natural counsellors and not aliens (Reynolds 1997: 270-1 (Stoyle 2000; .
In short, in many parts of Europe in the early modern period national identities were formed and reformed from wars with neighbouring powers and from civil conflicts. Mann's claim that nationalism originated during the French Revolution as a drive for democracy and citizenship has to be qualified. Many of the nationalisms (re-) emerging in response to the French revolution and invasions in Britain, the Netherlands, and Spain were conservative, supportive of older political and religious establishments (Nabulsi 1999: Ch.2; Verheijin 2016: 319-23) .
Warfare and the sacralisation of national communities
Warfare then was ambiguous for state formation, sometimes accelerating it, sometimes threatening the integrity of states, depending on the characteristics of the populations they governed. This suggests we need to separate out the processes by which war affects state-formation from those that shaped nation-formation before going on to examine the interaction between the two.
A sense of national identity may emerge from many sources, including a sense Such commemorations of the national dead coming to the fore in a period of largescale conflict could be seen as a means of overcoming the anguish of mass death. As
George Mosse (1990) and Anthony Smith (2003: Chs. 2,9) also argued, they also had the capacity of binding survivors to the values for which the dead supposedly fought, thereby contributing to the formation of a cohesive community. These commemorative rituals marked profound shifts in attitudes to death, time, and social status. Whereas in premodern societies death meant an individual transition into an otherworldly realm, and death was differentiated by estate. In contrast, in the thisworldly and future-oriented ideology of nationalism the cult of the martial dead was democratized. Remembrance was no longer reserved for the nobility but now addressed all who had suffered for the nations (Koselleck (2002: 289-91) . Arguably the experience of defeat generates more radical popular energies. In the era of nationalism the consequences of defeat were more intense, because of the greater scale of wars and because defeat could be seen as moral failure of the people itself, not just of its governing class (Horne 2008: 16-7) . This could inspire a popular revolt against establishments, the search for an alternative historical vision of the nation, and for scapegoats, and a root and branch reformation of social and political institutions. The shattering defeat of Imperial Germany in the First World War with the loss of territory and population to neighbouring states inspired not only leftist revolutionary movements but also radical nationalist programmes of regeneration and irredentism. These latter campaigns were spearheaded by ex-soldier's organizations embittered at the loss of military prestige, and by populations uprooted from their former homelands.
All four factors contribute to the social embedding of myths by a variety of social actors so that these myths became available as resources for interpreting and giving meaning to everyday life experiences. In high culture the images of past 
Tensions and interplays between states and nations
This might imply that in the modern period the political and social embedding of national myths and symbols results in an increasing integration of state and nation.
However, war has also in the modern period periodically uncaged populations by The contemporary German preoccupation with their 'unmasterable past' owes much to the legacy of the Holocaust, but it has also been shaped by a long range political and territorial instability as a result of war. A cultural conception of the German nation preceded the formation of a German state (though one also shaped by memories of the Holy Roman Empire). Warfare created the German nation-state in 1871 but also has regularly endangered it. After unification Germany was regarded by the advocates of Grossdeutschland as an unfinished nation-state, failing to include all Germans and with substantial Danish, Polish and Walloon minorities within its 1871 borders. In the 20 th century Germany's borders radically expanded or contracted nine times (in 1914, 1918, 1923, 1939, 1941, 1945, 1949, 1961, and 1990 Imperial dissolution in the 20 th century has been followed by imperial rollbacks in part arising from the security problems created by the new states, in part from temptations to exploit power vacuums. 
Conclusions
Bringing warfare into theories of nationalism challenges those approaches that that understand national and nation-state formation as a product of modernisation, since war is an unpredictable phenomenon that crosses the premodern-modern divide, with often far reaching consequences. Wars tend to embed a sense of historicity (however mythic) into emergent nations when they set in chain long lasting developments, memories of which shape populations' perceptions of their place in space and time and belief systems. Such perceptions inflect how states and their populations engage with modernisation, which throws up threats as well as opportunities. One of the claims of nationalists, sometimes in association with, sometimes in opposition to, religious adherents, is to make sense of the randomness of history, often created by the vicissitudes of war. Given that nationalists define the nation as a community of ultimate loyalty, performance in war has been used as a test of the potency of national identity, failure in which continues to lead to prolonged crises of reflection and revaluation with major cultural and political consequences -as we saw in the USA after the Vietnam war.
Wars vary in their characteristics, and when we consider the relationship between war and nationalism we need to consider the type of war and the context in which it is fought. Our view of the nation-state is structured by the consequences of interstate warfare on the European subcontinent from which arose a rough correspondence between state and nation. In playing a significant part in the construction of the nation-state, European warfare then provided the framework for the triple revolutions (political, economic and cultural) of modernity. But most of the polities we call nation-states have arisen via imperial collapse in total war and deviate considerably from the European 'norm'. Such nation-states, if we can call them that, by virtue of their fractured character and economic vulnerability, cannot easily be depicted as the institutional vessels of industrial modernisation. The modern international system itself also seems removed from the harmonious system of locks that Gellner envisaged in his earlier writings on nationalism. Formal empires may have largely come to an end, but the new states confront a world economic and political system dominated by Western powers that itself has an imperial character.
The security problems of the postcolonial world themselves invite forms of reimperialisation by competing great powers, including Russia and China. These multiple challenges are the source of much of the current world disorders and generate further rounds of nationalism.
1 Tilly (1992: 44) defines the state 'as any organization that commanded substantial means of coercion and successfully claimed the durable priority over other users of coercion within at least one bounded territory.' Note there is no reference to legitimacy. 2 Mann distinguishes between states exercising despotic and infrastructural power, the first a zero-sum approach that operates through coercion, and the second that is generative arising from social cooperation. During the later Middle Ages states began to exercise power through co-ordination with other power groups, though this was in the form of a territorial federalism. The nation-state is in effect the organic state (fused with the interests of dominant classes), which is able to penetrate much of society.
